diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c | 69 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | tests/features/ssl-authz.t | 75 |
2 files changed, 143 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c index 7b1beac0914..a00202e4732 100644 --- a/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c +++ b/rpc/rpc-transport/socket/src/socket.c @@ -45,6 +45,72 @@ #define SSL_CA_LIST_OPT "transport.socket.ssl-ca-list" #define OWN_THREAD_OPT "transport.socket.own-thread" +/* + * This list was derived by taking the cipher list "HIGH:!SSLv2" (the previous + * default) and excluding CBC entries to mitigate the "POODLE" attack. It + * should be re-evaluated in light of each future vulnerability, as those are + * discovered. + */ +static char *default_cipher_list = + "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:" + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:" + "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:" + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:" + "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:" + "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:" + "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:" + "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:" + "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:" + "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:" + "AECDH-AES256-SHA:" + "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "ADH-AES256-SHA256:" + "ADH-AES256-SHA:" + "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:" + "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:" + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:" + "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:" + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:" + "AES256-GCM-SHA384:" + "AES256-SHA256:" + "AES256-SHA:" + "CAMELLIA256-SHA:" + "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:" + "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:" + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:" + "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" + "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:" + "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:" + "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:" + "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:" + "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:" + "AECDH-AES128-SHA:" + "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "ADH-AES128-SHA256:" + "ADH-AES128-SHA:" + "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:" + "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:" + "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:" + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:" + "AES128-GCM-SHA256:" + "AES128-SHA256:" + "AES128-SHA:" + "CAMELLIA128-SHA"; /* no colon for last entry */ + /* TBD: do automake substitutions etc. (ick) to set these. */ #if !defined(DEFAULT_CERT_PATH) #define DEFAULT_CERT_PATH "/etc/ssl/glusterfs.pem" @@ -3402,6 +3468,7 @@ socket_init (rpc_transport_t *this) uint32_t keepalive = 0; uint32_t backlog = 0; int session_id = 0; + char *cipher_list = default_cipher_list; if (this->private) { gf_log_callingfn (this->name, GF_LOG_ERROR, @@ -3599,7 +3666,7 @@ socket_init (rpc_transport_t *this) priv->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(priv->ssl_meth); if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(priv->ssl_ctx, - "HIGH:-SSLv2") == 0) { + cipher_list) == 0) { gf_log(this->name,GF_LOG_ERROR, "failed to find any valid ciphers"); goto err; diff --git a/tests/features/ssl-authz.t b/tests/features/ssl-authz.t new file mode 100755 index 00000000000..a00c07a1310 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/features/ssl-authz.t @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +. $(dirname $0)/../include.rc +. $(dirname $0)/../volume.rc + +ping_file () { + echo hello > $1 2> /dev/null +} +for d in /etc/ssl /etc/openssl /usr/local/etc/openssl ; do + if test -d $d ; then + SSL_BASE=$d + break + fi +done +SSL_KEY=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.key +SSL_CERT=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.pem +SSL_CA=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.ca + +cleanup; +rm -f $SSL_BASE/glusterfs.* +mkdir -p $B0/1 +mkdir -p $M0 + +TEST glusterd +TEST pidof glusterd +TEST $CLI volume info; + +# Construct a cipher list that excludes CBC because of POODLE. +# http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-3566 +# +# Since this is a bit opaque, here's what it does: +# (1) Get the ciphers matching a normal cipher-list spec +# (2) Delete any colon-separated entries containing "CBC" +# (3) Collapse adjacent colons from deleted entries +# (4) Remove colons at the beginning or end +function valid_ciphers { + openssl ciphers 'HIGH:!SSLv2' | sed \ + -e '/[^:]*CBC[^:]*/s///g' \ + -e '/::*/s//:/g' \ + -e '/^:/s///' \ + -e '/:$/s///' +} + +TEST openssl genrsa -out $SSL_KEY 1024 +TEST openssl req -new -x509 -key $SSL_KEY -subj /CN=Anyone -out $SSL_CERT +ln $SSL_CERT $SSL_CA + +TEST $CLI volume create $V0 $H0:$B0/1 +TEST $CLI volume set $V0 server.ssl on +TEST $CLI volume set $V0 client.ssl on +#EST $CLI volume set $V0 ssl.cipher-list $(valid_ciphers) +#EST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow Anyone +TEST $CLI volume start $V0 + +# This mount should WORK. +TEST glusterfs --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0 +TEST ping_file $M0/before +EXPECT_WITHIN $UMOUNT_TIMEOUT "Y" force_umount $M0 + +# Change the authorized user name. Note that servers don't pick up changes +# automagically like clients do, so we have to stop/start ourselves. +TEST $CLI volume stop $V0 +#EST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow NotYou +TEST $CLI volume start $V0 + +# This mount should FAIL because the identity given by our certificate does not +# match the allowed user. In other words, authentication works (they know who +# we are) but authorization doesn't (we're not the right person). +#EST $GFS --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0 + +# Looks like /*/bin/glusterfs isn't returning error status correctly (again). +# Actually try doing something to get a real error. +#EST ! ping_file $M0/after + +cleanup; |