diff options
| author | Amar Tumballi <amarts@redhat.com> | 2018-11-08 11:02:32 +0530 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Shyamsundar Ranganathan <srangana@redhat.com> | 2018-11-09 14:04:35 +0000 |
| commit | f0b5816f775ee75d42946694f031e70616a98cd9 (patch) | |
| tree | 223a4fad4eab7c4e3aad751126d072034a311a64 /xlators/storage/posix/src/posix-handle.h | |
| parent | 9d9b9745c7e424f01e5526b23b1da17db263275e (diff) | |
server: don't allow '/' in basename
Server stack needs to have all the sort of validation, assuming
clients can be compromized. It is possible for a compromized
client to send basenames with paths with '/', and with that
create files without permission on server. By sanitizing the basename,
and not allowing anything other than actual directory as the parent
for any entry creation, we can mitigate the effects of clients
not able to exploit the server.
Fixes: CVE-2018-14651
Fixes: bz#1647667
Change-Id: I5dc0da0da2713452ff2b65ac2ddbccf1a267dc20
Signed-off-by: Amar Tumballi <amarts@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'xlators/storage/posix/src/posix-handle.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | xlators/storage/posix/src/posix-handle.h | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/xlators/storage/posix/src/posix-handle.h b/xlators/storage/posix/src/posix-handle.h index 621f8f4d450..04ab0fa1dd5 100644 --- a/xlators/storage/posix/src/posix-handle.h +++ b/xlators/storage/posix/src/posix-handle.h @@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ break; \ } \ \ - if (strstr (loc->name, "../")) { \ + if (strchr (loc->name, '/')) { \ gf_msg (this->name, GF_LOG_ERROR, 0, P_MSG_ENTRY_HANDLE_CREATE, \ - "'../' in name not allowed: (%s)", loc->name); \ + "'/' in name not allowed: (%s)", loc->name); \ op_ret = -1; \ break; \ } \ |