summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorRaghavendra Bhat <raghavendra@redhat.com>2013-04-19 12:27:03 +0530
committerVijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>2014-02-10 23:32:05 -0800
commit28209283a67f13802cc0c1d3df07c676926810a2 (patch)
tree5cf62085fa1a4bbc6d76eb1763f343c6116ea195 /xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c
parent97ce783de326b51fcba65737f07db2c314d1e218 (diff)
protocol/server: do not do root-squashing for trusted clients
* As of now clients mounting within the storage pool using that machine's ip/hostname are trusted clients (i.e clients local to the glusterd). * Be careful when the request itself comes in as nfsnobody (ex: posix tests). So move the squashing part to protocol/server when it creates a new frame for the request, instead of auth part of rpc layer. * For nfs servers do root-squashing without checking if it is trusted client, as all the nfs servers would be running within the storage pool, hence will be trusted clients for the bricks. * Provide one more option for mounting which actually says root-squash should/should not happen. This value is given priority only for the trusted clients. For non trusted clients, the volume option takes the priority. But for trusted clients if root-squash should not happen, then they have to be mounted with root-squash=no option. (This is done because by default blocking root-squashing for the trusted clients will cause problems for smb and UFO clients for which the requests have to be squashed if the option is enabled). * For geo-replication and defrag clients do not do root-squashing. * Introduce a new option in open-behind for doing read after successful open. Change-Id: I8a8359840313dffc34824f3ea80a9c48375067f0 BUG: 954057 Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Bhat <raghavendra@redhat.com> Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/4863 Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com> Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c')
-rw-r--r--xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c157
1 files changed, 157 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c b/xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c
index b2b6c486fe1..c11011abf9f 100644
--- a/xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c
+++ b/xlators/protocol/server/src/server-helpers.c
@@ -302,6 +302,11 @@ get_frame_from_request (rpcsvc_request_t *req)
{
call_frame_t *frame = NULL;
client_t *client = NULL;
+ client_t *tmp_client = NULL;
+ xlator_t *this = NULL;
+ server_conf_t *priv = NULL;
+ clienttable_t *clienttable = NULL;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
GF_VALIDATE_OR_GOTO ("server", req, out);
@@ -315,6 +320,57 @@ get_frame_from_request (rpcsvc_request_t *req)
frame->root->unique = req->xid;
+ client = req->trans->xl_private;
+ this = req->trans->xl;
+ priv = this->private;
+ clienttable = this->ctx->clienttable;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < clienttable->max_clients; i++) {
+ tmp_client = clienttable->cliententries[i].client;
+ if (client == tmp_client) {
+ /* for non trusted clients username and password
+ would not have been set. So for non trusted clients
+ (i.e clients not from the same machine as the brick,
+ and clients from outside the storage pool)
+ do the root-squashing.
+ TODO: If any client within the storage pool (i.e
+ mounting within a machine from the pool but using
+ other machine's ip/hostname from the same pool)
+ is present treat it as a trusted client
+ */
+ if (!client->auth.username && req->pid != NFS_PID)
+ RPC_AUTH_ROOT_SQUASH (req);
+
+ /* Problem: If we just check whether the client is
+ trusted client and do not do root squashing for
+ them, then for smb clients and UFO clients root
+ squashing will never happen as they use the fuse
+ mounts done within the trusted pool (i.e they are
+ trusted clients).
+ Solution: To fix it, do root squashing for trusted
+ clients also. If one wants to have a client within
+ the storage pool for which root-squashing does not
+ happen, then the client has to be mounted with
+ --no-root-squash option. But for defrag client and
+ gsyncd client do not do root-squashing.
+ */
+ if (client->auth.username &&
+ req->pid != GF_CLIENT_PID_NO_ROOT_SQUASH &&
+ req->pid != GF_CLIENT_PID_GSYNCD &&
+ req->pid != GF_CLIENT_PID_DEFRAG)
+ RPC_AUTH_ROOT_SQUASH (req);
+
+ /* For nfs clients the server processes will be running
+ within the trusted storage pool machines. So if we
+ do not do root-squashing for nfs servers, thinking
+ that its a trusted client, then root-squashing wont
+ work for nfs clients.
+ */
+ if (req->pid == NFS_PID)
+ RPC_AUTH_ROOT_SQUASH (req);
+ }
+ }
+
frame->root->uid = req->uid;
frame->root->gid = req->gid;
frame->root->pid = req->pid;
@@ -935,3 +991,104 @@ server_ctx_get (client_t *client, xlator_t *xlator)
out:
return ctx;
}
+
+int
+auth_set_username_passwd (dict_t *input_params, dict_t *config_params,
+ client_t *client)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ data_t *allow_user = NULL;
+ data_t *passwd_data = NULL;
+ char *username = NULL;
+ char *password = NULL;
+ char *brick_name = NULL;
+ char *searchstr = NULL;
+ char *username_str = NULL;
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ char *username_cpy = NULL;
+
+ ret = dict_get_str (input_params, "username", &username);
+ if (ret) {
+ gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_DEBUG,
+ "username not found, returning DONT-CARE");
+ /* For non trusted clients username and password
+ will not be there. So dont reject the client.
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = dict_get_str (input_params, "password", &password);
+ if (ret) {
+ gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_WARNING,
+ "password not found, returning DONT-CARE");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = dict_get_str (input_params, "remote-subvolume", &brick_name);
+ if (ret) {
+ gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "remote-subvolume not specified");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = gf_asprintf (&searchstr, "auth.login.%s.allow", brick_name);
+ if (-1 == ret) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ allow_user = dict_get (config_params, searchstr);
+ GF_FREE (searchstr);
+
+ if (allow_user) {
+ username_cpy = gf_strdup (allow_user->data);
+ if (!username_cpy)
+ goto out;
+
+ username_str = strtok_r (username_cpy, " ,", &tmp);
+
+ while (username_str) {
+ if (!fnmatch (username_str, username, 0)) {
+ ret = gf_asprintf (&searchstr,
+ "auth.login.%s.password",
+ username);
+ if (-1 == ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ passwd_data = dict_get (config_params,
+ searchstr);
+ GF_FREE (searchstr);
+
+ if (!passwd_data) {
+ gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "wrong username/password "
+ "combination");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = !((strcmp (data_to_str (passwd_data),
+ password))?0: -1);
+ if (!ret) {
+ client->auth.username =
+ gf_strdup (username);
+ client->auth.passwd =
+ gf_strdup (password);
+ }
+ if (ret == -1)
+ gf_log ("auth/login", GF_LOG_ERROR,
+ "wrong password for user %s",
+ username);
+ break;
+ }
+ username_str = strtok_r (NULL, " ,", &tmp);
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ GF_FREE (username_cpy);
+
+ return ret;
+}