socket: disallow CBC cipher modes

This is related to CVE-2014-3566 a.k.a. POODLE.

	http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-3566

POODLE is specific to CBC cipher modes in SSLv3.  Because there is no
way to prevent SSLv3 fallback on a system with an unpatched version of
OpenSSL, users of such systems can only be protected by disallowing CBC
modes.  The default cipher-mode specification in our code has been
changed accordingly.  Users can still set their own cipher modes if they
wish.  To support them, the ssl-authz.t test script provides an example
of how to combine the CBC exclusion with other criteria in a script.

Cherry picked from commit 378a0a19d95e552220d71b13be685f4772c576cd:
> Change-Id: Ib1fa547082fbb7de9df94ffd182b1800d6e354e5
> BUG: 1155328
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Darcy <jdarcy@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/8962
> Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kaleb KEITHLEY <kkeithle@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vijay Bellur <vbellur@redhat.com>

ssl-auth.t has been modified to not set the auth.ssl-allow option. This
option is not available in the 3.5 branch.

Change-Id: Ib1fa547082fbb7de9df94ffd182b1800d6e354e5
BUG: 1157661
Signed-off-by: Niels de Vos <ndevos@redhat.com>
Reviewed-on: http://review.gluster.org/8979
Reviewed-by: Kaleb KEITHLEY <kkeithle@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Darcy <jdarcy@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gluster Build System <jenkins@build.gluster.com>

1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tests/features/ssl-authz.t b/tests/features/ssl-authz.t
new file mode 100755
index 00000000000..a00c07a1310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/features/ssl-authz.t
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+. $(dirname $0)/../include.rc
+. $(dirname $0)/../volume.rc
+
+ping_file () {
+        echo hello > $1 2> /dev/null
+}
+for d in /etc/ssl /etc/openssl /usr/local/etc/openssl ; do
+        if test -d $d ; then
+                SSL_BASE=$d
+                break
+        fi
+done
+SSL_KEY=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.key
+SSL_CERT=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.pem
+SSL_CA=$SSL_BASE/glusterfs.ca
+
+cleanup;
+rm -f $SSL_BASE/glusterfs.*
+mkdir -p $B0/1
+mkdir -p $M0
+
+TEST glusterd
+TEST pidof glusterd
+TEST $CLI volume info;
+
+# Construct a cipher list that excludes CBC because of POODLE.
+# http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-3566
+#
+# Since this is a bit opaque, here's what it does:
+#	(1) Get the ciphers matching a normal cipher-list spec
+#	(2) Delete any colon-separated entries containing "CBC"
+#	(3) Collapse adjacent colons from deleted entries
+#	(4) Remove colons at the beginning or end
+function valid_ciphers {
+	openssl ciphers 'HIGH:!SSLv2' | sed	\
+		-e '/[^:]*CBC[^:]*/s///g'	\
+		-e '/::*/s//:/g'		\
+		-e '/^:/s///'			\
+		-e '/:$/s///'
+}
+
+TEST openssl genrsa -out $SSL_KEY 1024
+TEST openssl req -new -x509 -key $SSL_KEY -subj /CN=Anyone -out $SSL_CERT
+ln $SSL_CERT $SSL_CA
+
+TEST $CLI volume create $V0 $H0:$B0/1
+TEST $CLI volume set $V0 server.ssl on
+TEST $CLI volume set $V0 client.ssl on
+#EST $CLI volume set $V0 ssl.cipher-list $(valid_ciphers)
+#EST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow Anyone
+TEST $CLI volume start $V0
+
+# This mount should WORK.
+TEST glusterfs --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0
+TEST ping_file $M0/before
+EXPECT_WITHIN $UMOUNT_TIMEOUT "Y" force_umount $M0
+
+# Change the authorized user name.  Note that servers don't pick up changes
+# automagically like clients do, so we have to stop/start ourselves.
+TEST $CLI volume stop $V0
+#EST $CLI volume set $V0 auth.ssl-allow NotYou
+TEST $CLI volume start $V0
+
+# This mount should FAIL because the identity given by our certificate does not
+# match the allowed user.  In other words, authentication works (they know who
+# we are) but authorization doesn't (we're not the right person).
+#EST $GFS --volfile-server=$H0 --volfile-id=$V0 $M0
+
+# Looks like /*/bin/glusterfs isn't returning error status correctly (again).
+# Actually try doing something to get a real error.
+#EST ! ping_file $M0/after
+
+cleanup;